
















An  experiment  is  designed  to  test  if  individuals  show 
(unrealistic)  optimism  when  determining  their  subjective 
probabilities about exogenous circumstances. Subjects in the 
control  group  make  an  informed  guess  about  a  number, 
under a payment scheme that rewards close guesses. In the 
treatment  group,  subjects'  payments  depend  on  the  actual 
number as well as on the closeness of the guess, and they are 
thus  given  an  incentive  to  guess  optimistically.  The  data 
suggests that there is an optimistic bias. 
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1. Introduction 
Unrealistic  optimism  refers  to  the  phenomenon  that  people  systematically 
overestimate the probability that good things will happen to them and underestimate 
the  probability  that  bad  things  will  happen.  Weinstein  (1980)  found  unrealistic 
optimism in subjects' estimates of the probabilities of a number of future life events 
in that subjects judged the risk of positive events occurring to them as larger than for 
the  average  person,  and  the  risk  of  negative  events  smaller.  Several  subsequent 
psychological studies confirm the view that people exhibit unrealistic optimism (see 
the survey of the literature in Wenglert & Rosén, 2000).  
 
There  are  other  interesting  and  related  forms  of  judgement  bias:  overconfidence 
which implies an over-estimation of one's own ability, and self-serving bias which is 
a tendency to evaluate evidence or make judgements in a way that benefits oneself. 
It  follows  that  self-serving  bias  can  accommodate  both  optimism  and 
overconfidence.
3 Such judgement biases can be expected to affect decisions taken 
without precise knowledge of probabilities, for example in the financial area. They 
have proven useful in explaining financial market data, see e.g. de Meza & Southey 
(1996)  for  optimism  in  investment  decisions,  and  Barber  &  Odean  (2001)  for 
overconfidence and trading activity.   
 
A  couple  of  economic  experiments  study  the  existence  of  optimism  and  related 
phenomena.  Forsythe, Rietz & Ross (1999) study wish fulfilment, defined as the 
                                                 
3 The discovery by Svenson (1981) that more than half of survey respondents see themselves as more 
competent drivers than average can be seen as an example of both over-confidence and self-serving 
bias, but less obviously of optimism (other than of one's own judgement).   2 
“tendency to overestimate the probability of desirable events” (page 89). They find 
evidence of it in the form of a bias in traders’ portfolio holdings in actual election 
stock markets, and a bias in prices in laboratory markets with induced preferences. 
Babcock,  Loewenstein,  Issacharoff  &  Camerer  (1995)  found  evidence  of  a  self-
serving bias in perceptions of fairness in an experiment where subjects were given 
roles as plaintiffs and defendants in a legal dispute over a claim for damages. Kaplan 
& Ruffle (2001) argue that strategic behavior may affect the measure of self-serving 
bias. They use a design without scope for strategic behavior but with incentives that 
would encourage self-serving beliefs about the rationality of others. In their data 
there is little evidence of a self-serving bias. 
 
The experiment presented in this paper differs from previous ones in that it uses a 
setting where subjects' payoffs are determined independently of the characteristics, 
preferences and market decisions of other subjects. The challenge when designing 
experiments on judgement biases is to separate subjects' subjective probabilities of 
uncertain events or circumstances from their preferences over these. The approach in 
the present experiment is to have subjects make an informed guess about a pre-
determined number. In the treatment groups subjects are paid according to both how 
close the guess came to the actual number and how high the value guessed at was, in 
the control groups subjects are paid only according to the closeness of the guess. A 
systematic  difference  between  guesses  is  taken  as  an  indication  of  unrealistic 
optimism (or pessimism, depending on the sign of the difference). 
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The outline of the paper is as follows. First the experimental design is introduced 
and the expected results described. Then the results are presented, followed by a 
conclusion. 
 
2. Experimental design 
The experiment was run at Stockholm University in two rounds, the first in May of 
2001  and  the  second  in  February  of  2003.  All  participants  were  students  in 
Economics,  in  2001  in  the  introductory  course  and  in  2003  in  the  intermediate 
course. The two experiments presented the subjects with the same kind of decision 
to make, but the procedure and the incentive structure differed slightly between the 
two rounds as will be described below. 
 
The 2001 sessions were run during the seminar sessions of the course, in six groups 
with around 25 students in each. Altogether 143 students participated  while two 
chose not to. The procedure was as follows. At the beginning of class the students 
were offered to participate in an experiment in which they could make some money. 
One of two different instruction sheets was distributed and also read out loud.
4 The 
task was to guess the number of green balls in a container. The container was made 
of transparent plastic and filled with white and green Styrofoam balls.
5 The number 
of green versus white balls differed between seminar groups. The container was 
passed round the room from student to student and care was taken to prevent anyone 
from keeping the container for very long. It would hardly have been possible to 
                                                 
4 Translations of the instruction sheets are found in the appendix. 
5 The container was cylindrical, 18 by 14 centimetres and the diameter of the balls was 3 centimetres. 
It held about 80 balls altogether.   4 
count the balls exactly anyway, but the idea was that subjects should be able to make 
a reasonable guess about the number of green balls in the jar. In each seminar group 
one of the following two methods of payment were offered: 
 
Neutral treatment: The person whose guess comes closest to the 
actual number of  green balls  gets 200 kronor,  the second best 
guesser  gets  99  kronor  and  the  third  best  50  kronor.
6  If  two 
people make the best guess they share 299 kronor, three or more 
share 349 kronor. 
 
Biased treatment: The payment in kronor to each person is the 
number of green balls minus the "guessing fault", measured as the 
difference in absolute terms between the guess and the number of 
balls. 
 
After the container had been passed round the room, students were asked to fill in 
their forms with their guesses. Participants were asked to write their names on their 
forms, and any non-participants were asked to just hand in a blank form. When 
forms  were  collected,  which  was  after  about  10  minutes,  the  experiment  was 
completed except for payments. For this purpose the jar was left in the classroom 
until  the  break,  when  it was  opened  and  the  green  balls  counted  publicly.  Cash 
payments were made to the three best guessers (in the neutral treatment), or to each 
according to the number of green balls and their guess (in the biased treatment).  
 
                                                 
6 10 kronor was approximately 1 $US at the time of the experiment. 
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The 2003 session maintained the basic procedure of handing round the container 
with green and white balls and paying subjects according to their guesses in one of 
two ways. However, two aspects of the procedure from the 2001 session appeared 
unnecessary: the different numbers of green balls in the different seminar groups and 
the lower expected payment in the neutral treatment. Thus the following procedure 
was used for the 2003 session.  
(i)  There was only one large session with 95 subjects 
(ii)  One and the same container was passed round among these subjects 
(iii)  The  incentive  payments  in  the  neutral  treatment  were  increased.  Five 
people were paid and the prizes were 500, 400, 300, 200 and 100 kronor. 
(iv)  In the biased treatment five subjects were randomly selected to receive 
money, and their payments were ten times those of the 2001 session. 
 
Since all subjects made their decisions in the same room there was the potential 
problem that subjects sitting near one another could influence each other’s guesses. 
To minimize this effect subjects were of course asked to be completely quiet during 
the experiment and not show their written decisions to any one else. To ensure that 
between-subject  effects  would not contaminate  the data, instructions sheets were 
alternated so that each subject sat next to someone who participated in the other 
treatment.  Thus  if  some  subjects  influenced  the  guesses  of  nearby  subjects,  the 
influence should affect both treatments equally and would not give rise to treatment 
effects. 
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Average incentives in the neutral 2001 session were about 10 kronor per person. In 
the other sessions (including the neutral 2003 session) earnings averaged about 30 
kronor per person, with a range from zero to 500. 
 
3. Predictions 
The  decision  that  each  of  the  subjects  made  in  this  experiment  can  be  seen  as 
consisting of two parts: firstly to estimate the probabilities of different values for the 
number of green balls and secondly to decide on the guessed number. The subjects 
would use the visual impression gained when the jar with green and white balls was 
passed  around,  the  information  about  the  payment  structure  plus  any  other 
information that may be relevant (e.g. beliefs about the decisions of other subjects). 
The observed outcome of this process is the guessed numbers and the idea of the 
experiment is to draw conclusions from this data about the first stage in the decision 
process, i.e. the estimation of probabilities. 
 
The incentive structure in the unbiased treatment is that of a tournament (see Lazear 
& Rosen, 1981). Consider a simplified version of the guessing task in the neutral 
treatment, one where two subjects guess at one of three numbers, A, B or C, and 
where  there  is  one  prize  P.  The  closest  guess  wins  and  if  both  guess  the  same 
number  they  share  the  prize.  For  a  player  who  knows  the  actual  number  with 
certainty it is a (weakly) dominant strategy to guess that number. However, for a 
player who assigns a positive probability to more than one number, the supposed 
guesses of the other player may affect the guess. A simple example is if player one 
thinks that numbers A and B occur with probabilities 0.6 and 0.4, but is sure that   7 
player two will guess number A. The expected payoff for player one of guessing 
number A is then  P P 3 . 0 0 4 . 0 2 6 . 0 = × + × , while the expected payoff of guessing 
number B is  P P 4 . 0 0 4 . 0 6 . 0 = × + × . In this example player one would be better off 
guessing the less likely number. 
 
Could such tournament incentives have a systematic effect on subjects' guesses in 
the  unbiased  treatment?  Several  factors,  partly  to  do  with  the  design  of  the 
experiment,  speak  against  that.  If  some  subjects  picked  unlikely  numbers  the 
variance of guesses might be affected but there should be no directional bias. Also, 
the  payment  structure  in  the  unbiased  treatment  specifies  that  if  two  (or  three) 
players guess closest, they share the sum of first and second (and third) prize. This 
reduces the loss from having to share the winning prize. Furthermore, it is difficult 
to imagine how to second-guess the guesses of others in this particular experimental 
situation. The tournament incentive structure in the neutral treatment should thus 
give subjects the incentive to guess correctly. 
 
The payment structure in the biased treatment does not reward only guesses that are 
close to actual numbers. Here the payment is determined by the number of actual 
balls minus the absolute value of the guessing fault.
7 In our example let the numbers 
A and B be 40 and 50. At probabilities 0.6 for A and 0.4 for B the expected payment 
when  guessing  A  is  40 40 4 . 0 40 6 . 0 = × + ×   and  when  guessing  B  it  is 
38 50 4 . 0 30 6 . 0 = × + × . If the probabilities are instead 0.4 for A and 0.6 for B the 
                                                 
7 In the 2001 session this is the payment to each subject, while in the 2003 session 10 percent of the 
subjects get 10 times that amount.   8 
expected  payments  become  40 40 6 . 0 40 4 . 0 = × + ×   when  guessing  A  and 
42 50 6 . 0 30 4 . 0 = × + ×  when guessing B. Thus two things have changed: the expected 
payment is highest when guessing the more likely number (as it should be), but in 
addition the actual value of the expected payment is higher for both numbers. This is 
"a good thing" and since an optimist overestimates the probability of good things, 
optimists should choose the second probability distribution, with more probability 
mass on higher numbers, more often. This would also imply that optimists guessed 
higher numbers. 
 
Thus the null hypothesis is that guesses should be no different between the biased 
and the neutral treatments, while a positive difference would suggest optimism and a 
negative  pessimism.  When  analysing  the  data  the  fact  that  guesses  could  differ 
because the actual number of green balls differed will be taken into account, and 
also the possibility of a gender difference. 
 
4. Results 
The separate distributions of the guesses for the 2001 and 2003 sessions, together 
with the total of the guesses in the two sessions, are shown in Figure 1. The mean 
guesses and the actual numbers are shown in Table 1.   
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Table 1: Mean and median of Guess and Actual numbers by Session and in Total 
 
  Session 2001  Session 2003  Total 
Mean Guess  42.2   38.6  40.8  
Mean Actual  42.4  41  41.8 
Median Guess  37  37  37 
Median Actual  38  41  41 
 
The table shows that guesses are slightly lower than actual numbers, particularly in 
the 2003 session, but on average guesses seem quite close to actual numbers. The 
data by session and in total is described in Figure 1. The distributions from the 2001 
and 2003 sessions are not significantly different (P-value 0.29 in a Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test for equality of distribution functions). 
 
Subjects  presumably  based  their  guesses  on  their  private  information,  i.e.  the 
number of green balls that they had been able to count as the container was passed 
round. This indicates that the guessed number of green balls is a "count variable" 
and that a regression model based on the Poisson distribution should be used. To 
avoid  the  overestimation  of  the  significance  of  variables  that  will  occur  if  the 
conditional variance is not identical with the conditional mean (as it is in the Poisson 
regression model), we will use the Negative binomial regression model (see Long, 
1997, chapter 8). Since subjects' guesses might be affected by their impressions of 
the relative number of green versus white balls, the effects of each of the actual 
numbers of green balls will be controlled for, as will the gender of the guesser.  
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Regression results are shown in Table 2 for the two sessions separately and together. 
Because of collinearity with the treatment variable (the actual value was the same 
for the treatment group and the control group only in the 2003 session) one of the 
actual  numbers  has  to  be  dropped  in  the  Total  regression  and  three  have  to  be 
dropped in the Session 2001 regression. Since most of the dummy variables for 
actual  number  have  effects  that  are  small  and  not  significant  it  does  not  seem 
important which ones of these are dropped.  In  the Total regression, Actual38 is 
dropped. In both regressions Actual51, which has a strongly significant effect in the 
regression for both sessions jointly, and Actual41, which is 0 in Session 2001 and 1 
in Session 2003, are retained. 
 
Table 2: Negative binomial regression of Guess by Session and in Total 
(z-values in parentheses) 
 
























Actual51  0.52 
(5.91)  --  0.51 
(4.55) 
Actual45  - 0.07 
(- 0.76)  --  - 0.06 
(- 0.68) 
Actual32  --  --  - 0.01 
(- 0.06) 




The treatment variable Opt1 is significant at the 10 percent level in the Session 2001 
and  Total  regressions  (and  close  to  that  in  the  Session  2003  regression).  The  11 
coefficient  is  about  the  same  in  all  three  regressions.  Thus  the  biased  treatment 
increases the guessed number by approximately the same amount in all three cases. 
The effect of gender is small and not significant in any of the regressions. Of the 
actual numbers it is only the largest number Actual51 that is significant and its effect 
is positive and quite large. 
 
The results of estimation with the treatment variable Opt1 and the Actual51 and 
Actual41 dummy variables are shown in Table 3. The table also includes the results 
of an OLS regression with the data from both sessions. 
 
Table 3: Negative binomial regression (NBRM) of Guess by Session and in Total 
(z-values in parentheses), plus OLS regression of Guess using Total data 































Actual51  0.53 










The p-value of Opt1 in the NBRM Total regression is 0.017, making the treatment 
variable  highly  significant.
8  This  suggests  that  there  is  an  optimism  effect.  The 
coefficients from the OLS Total regression are helpful in judging the size of this 
effect: subjects in the biased treatment guess on average that the number of green 
                                                 
8 In the 2001 regression the treatment variable has P-value 0.100 and in the 2003 regression 0.105.  12 
balls is higher by five. This means that the optimism bias increases the guess by 
about 12 percent.  
 
The Actual41 variable is significant at the 10 percent level, meaning that subjects in 
the 2003 session guess higher numbers than in the 2001 session. This could be due 
to  the  number  of  balls—41  being  the  second  highest  number—or  it  could  be  a 
session  effect.  The  Actual51  dummy  variable  is  highly  significant  and  the 
coefficient is quite large. The observations with 51 green balls are from two seminar 
groups and the average guesses are very similar in these two groups, 55.8 in one and 
54.7  in  the  other.  Estimating  the  model  without  the  observations  from  the  two 
Actual51 groups yields very similar results as before, as is shown in Table 4.   
 
Table 4: Negative binomial regression (NBRM) of Guess in Session 2001 
and in Total (z-values in parentheses), plus OLS regression of Guess using 
Total  data  (t-values  in  parentheses),  everywhere  excluding  the  45 






























In the 2001 regression the treatment variable now has a P-value of 0.089, in the 
NBRM  Total  regression  0.019  (and  in  the  OLS  regression  0.045).  It  seems  not  13 




The experiment presented here differed from previous experiments on optimism and 
other  judgement  biases  in  that  the  circumstance  subject  to  judgement  was  an 
exogenous and predetermined event (the number of green Styrofoam balls in a jar) 
rather than a condition determined as a part of the experiment. The data generated by 
the experiment indicates that there is an optimism bias.   14 
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Appendix: 
Translations of the instruction sheet for the "Neutral" treatment in Session 2001. 
 
AN ECONOMIC EXPERIMENT 
 
You are hereby invited to participate in an experiment about decision-making. A 
container with white and green balls will shortly be circulated in this room (during 
about 5 minutes). The procedure of the experiment is that you guess the number of 
green  balls  in  the  container  and  fill  out  this  form,  which  will  be  collected 
immediately afterwards. During  your next break I will return, we will count the 
number of balls in the jar (which has remained here), and the three persons who 
guessed most closely above or below the actual number of balls will be paid cash 
according to the following: 
      
Closest guess: 200 kronor 
Second closest guess: 99 kronor 
Third closest guess: 50 kronor 
 
If two people make the closest guess, these two will share 299 kronor, if three or 
more guess closest these share 349 kronor. For those who receive more than 100 
kronor we will pay income tax at a rate of 30 percent. The payments are thus net of 
taxes. 
 
It  is  important  that  you  decide  on  your  guess  yourself  without  discussing  with 
anyone else. We will read out the names of those who get paid, but your answer will 
remain anonymous in all other presentation of the experiment. (For the financial 
accounting  of  the  experiment  we  will  need  the  social  security  number  and  the 
address of those who get paid). 
 
I believe that the number of green balls is:____________________________ 
 
Name:_________________________________________________________ 
     
èèèèèèèè  Hand in the form when you have filled it out to this point. 
     
Actual number of green balls:_________________________________ 
     
Sum paid out:___________ 
     
Signature (in ink):_______________________________________________ 
     
Social security number (if more than 99 kronor):_______________________ 
 
Postal address:___________________________________________________ 
     
 
Thank you for your participation!  16 




AN ECONOMIC EXPERIMENT 
 
You are hereby invited to participate in an experiment about decision-making. A 
container with white and green balls will shortly be circulated in this room (during 
about 5 minutes). The procedure of the experiment is that you guess the number of 
green  balls  in  the  container  and  fill  out  this  form,  which  will  be  collected 
immediately afterwards. During  your next break I will return, we will count the 
number of balls in the jar (which has remained here), and you will be paid cash 
according to the following formula: 
      
Number of kronor you get = number of green balls minus "the guessing fault" 
 
The  guessing  fault  is  defined  as  the  difference  (measured  in  number  of  balls) 
between the actual number of balls and the number that you guessed. 
 
It  is  important  that  you  decide  on  your  guess  yourself  without  discussion  with 
anyone else. Your answer will remain anonymous (the names of the participants is 
needed for the financial accounting for the experiment but will not be made public). 
     
 
I believe that the number of green balls is:_________________________ 
     
 
Name:______________________________________________________ 
     
èèèèèèèè Hand in the form when you have filled it out to this point. 
     
 
 
Actual number of green balls:____________________________________ 
     
 
Sum paid out (number of green balls minus the guessing fault):__________ 
     
 
Signature (in ink):_____________________________________________ 
     
 
 
Thank you for your participation! 
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Translations of the instruction sheet for the "Neutral" treatment in Session 2003. 
 
 
AN ECONOMIC EXPERIMENT 
 
You are hereby invited to participate in an experiment about decision-making. A 
container with white and green balls will shortly be circulated in this room (during 
about 5 minutes). The procedure of the experiment is that you guess the number of 
green  balls  in  the  container  and  fill  out  this  form,  which  will  be  collected 
immediately afterwards. We will then count the number of balls in the jar (which 
has remained in this room), and pay in cash the five persons who guessed most 
closely according to the following: 
      
Closest guess: 500 kronor 
Second closest guess: 400 kronor 
Third closest guess: 300 kronor 
        Fourth closest guess: 200 kronor 
        Fifth closest guess: 100 kronor 
 
It does not matter if the guess is above or below the actual number. If two people 
make the closest guess these two will share 900 kronor, if three guess closest they 
share 1200 kronor etc. We will pay income tax at a rate of 30 percent and the 
payments are thus net of taxes. 
 
It  is  important  that  you  decide  on  your  guess  yourself  without  discussing  with 
anyone else. We will read out the names of those who get paid, but your answer will 
remain anonymous in all other presentation of  the experiment.  For the financial 
accounting  of  the  experiment  we  will  need  the  social  security  number  and  the 
address of those who get paid. 
     
 
I believe that the number of green balls is:____________________________ 
     
 
Name:_________________________________________________________ 
     
èèèèèèèè  Hand in the form when you have filled it out to this point. 
     
 
Actual number of green balls:_________________________________ 
     
 
Sum paid out if applicable:____________________ 
     
     
 
Thank you for your participation!  18 
 
Translations of the instruction sheet for the "Biased" treatment in Session 2003.  
 
 
AN ECONOMIC EXPERIMENT 
 
You are hereby invited to participate in an experiment about decision-making. A 
container with white and green balls will shortly be circulated in this room (during 
about 5 minutes). The procedure of the experiment is that you guess the number of 
green  balls  in  the  container  and  fill  out  this  form,  which  will  be  collected 
immediately afterwards. We will then count the number of balls in the jar (which 
has remained in this room), and select five people randomly. If you are selected you 
will be paid cash according to the following formula: 
      
Number of kronor you get =( number of green balls minus "the guessing fault") 
times 10 
 
The  guessing  fault  is  defined  as  the  difference  (measured  in  number  of  balls) 
between the actual number of balls and the number that you guessed. Example: If 
there are 7 green balls and you guess 11 and are selected you get (7-4)10=30 kronor. 
 
It  is  important  that  you  decide  on  your  guess  yourself  without  discussion  with 
anyone else. We will read out them names of those selected randomly, but your 
answer will remain anonymous in all other presentation of the experiment. We pay 
tax at a rate of 30 percent and payments are thus net of taxes. For the financial 
accounting of the experiment we will need the social security number and the postal 
address of those who get paid. 
     
 
I believe that the number of green balls is:_________________________ 
     
 
Name:______________________________________________________ 
     
èèèèèèèè Hand in the form when you have filled it out to this point. 
     
 
 
Actual number of green balls:____________________________________ 
     
 
Sum paid out if applicable,  
(number of green balls minus the guessing fault) times 10:_____________ 
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